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The response of developing countries to the U.S. proposal to
liberalize trade in financial services ranges from cautious to
hostile.  Opening borders to foreign competition - like the
wide-ranging domestic reforms  needed in  most developing
countries - must proceed, but at a moderate pace.
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When the General Agreement on Tariffs and  governnents) to continue to use the financial
Trade was instituted in 1948, its mandate  system as an instrument of public policy.
excluded such industries as banking, insurance,
and telecommunications.  It also reflects the weak situation of the
banking industry in many developing countries.
These service sectors were highly regulated  In some there is no real banking industry; in
and protected in most countries, partly because  many the banking sector is technically insolvent
of their sensitivitv to national security and  and needs costly restructuring and reform.
cultural identity.  Under U.S. pressure, the
Uruguay Round talks have included financial  Opening borders to foreign competition is
services, particularly banking.  essential to liberalization.  But this process must
proceed at the pace appropriate to the wide-
'rhe response of developing countries to the  ranging domestic reforms essential in most
U.S. proposal to liberalize trade in financial  developing countries.
services ranges from cautious to hostile.  Partly
this reflects concem about the perceived com-  Gelb and Sagari discuss many of the issues
parative advantage of industrial countries and  involved.
the desire of strong vested interests (including
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Trade  in  services  has  become  an increasingly  important  issue  as  evidenced
by its inclusion  in the  Uruguay  Pound  of  Multilateral  Trade  Negotiations.  To
contribute  to the World  Bank's  efforts  to disseminate  existing  research  and
policy  work in this  area,  this  paper  discusses  trade  in  banking  services,  and
the  international  dimension  of  financial  liberalization  more  generally.  Banking
services pose  distinctive  regulatory  problems which have been addressed
differently  across  countries.  This  raises  very  complex  and  specific  issues  that
need  to  be taken  into  account  in  multilateral  negotiations.1
Trade  in Banking  Services: Issues  for  Multilateral  Negotiations
Alan H. Gelb  and  Silvia  B. Sagari
I.  Introduction
When the  General  Agreement  of Tariffs  and  Trade  (GATT)  was instituted  in
1948,  its  mandate excluded industries such  as  banking, insurance and
telecommunications.  These  service  sectors  were  highly  regulated  and  protected
in  most  countries  for  various  reasons  including,  in  some  cases,  their  sensitivity
with  respect  to  national  security  or  cultural  identity.  Financial  services,  to
take one example,  involve  complex  issues  of prudential  regulation,  monetary
policy  and  stability  of financial  markets.
Under prompting  from  the  United  States,  Uruguay  Round  talks  have turned
to  financial  services,  banking  in  particular.  This  has  occurred  in  part  because
of the  growing  importance  of formal  finance  as GNP  per  head rises  and  because
a number  of developing  countries  are  now seen  as sizable  prospective  markets.
Another  reason  is the  dramatic  growth  of trade  in financial  services  between
industrial  countries  over  the  last  two  decades,  which  has  been partly  spurred
by rapid  technological  innovation.
Trade  in financial  services  is  4efined  here  as:
1  The  views  and  interpretations  in  this  document  are  those  of  the  authors
and  should  not  be attributed  to  the  World  Bank,  to  its  affiliated  organizations,
or to any individual  acting  in their  behalf. Thanks  are  due  to Bela  Balassa,
Paul  Meo and  Patrick  Messerlin  for  helpful  comments. All errors  are the  sole
responsibility  of the  authors.2
The  provision  of  financial  services  by  an  institution  in  one  country
to  a consumer  of those  services  in  another  country  (i.e. provision
of services  across  boIders).  This is a relatively  pure form of
trade.
The  provision  of  services  through  the  establishment  of  subsidiaries,
branches  or agencies  by a financial  institution  in  a country  other
than  its  home country;  here,  trade  is  associated  with investment. 2
In general, the  latter issue has  received  more attention in
discussions  of  barriers  to  trade  in  financial  services. Cross-border  trade,  on
the other  hand,  has generally  been viewed  within the context  of removal  of
exchange  controls,  or  liberalization  of  capital  movements.  The  distinction  may
be important  because  each  of these  two forms  of trade  may call for different
approaches  and  solutions  in the  multilateral  trade  negotiations.
Financial  services  may  be defined  as comprising  (a)  deposit  taking  and
lending,  whether  in  domestic  or  foreign  currency,  to  governments,  corporations,
private  individuals,  and others;  (b)  specialized  forms  of lending,  including
trade  financing,  loan  syndications  and  participation;  (c)  trading  and dealing
in domestic  and foreign  currencies;  and (d)  various advisory  and brokerage
services.  This paper, however,  will concentrate  on those services  most
frequently  provided  by  banking  institutions.
2  A branch  is a legal  entity  of the  home country  and is treated  as an
integral  part  of the  parent  bank. A subsidiary  is  a legal  entity  of the  host-
country; it  is a  separate corporation  wholly or majority owned by  the
transnational  bank  parent.  The  difference  matters  because  of  regulatory
treatment  and,  in  particular,  capital  requirements.3
A.  Products.  Agents  and  Markets
Banking  and  financial  services  interact  with  a  very  broad  range  of
economic  activities  and agents  and play an important  role in the credit,
monetary,  and payments  systems.  They have close relationships  with public
policy,  and  their  operation  is  3trongly  influenced  by  the  regulatory  environment
and  other  aspects  of  the  economy.  The  issue  of  opening  them  up  to international
trade  is,  consequently,  very  complex.
The  first mode  of  trade in  financial services,  which  involves
international  exchange  of financial  flows,  and essentially  the  liberalization
of  the  capital  account,  allows  agents  in  one  country  to  enjoy  financial  services
provided  by institutions  in  other  countries.j  The  range  of  activities  where  this
is possible  is limited  because  of the  need for  a certain  degree  of proximity
between  intermediaries  and their  clients. Proximity  between  the supplier  and
the  purchaser  is  usually  more important  for  services  than  for  goods. At first
sight,  it  is  not  clear  why  proximity  should  be important  for  financial  services,
in the  same  way as, say,  for  haircuts. But,  the  characteristics  of financial
transactions-  -mainly  the  need  for  frequent  information  and  trust--can  make  this
a  pressing  need.
The  second  mode  of trade  involves  direct  foreign  investment  in  financial
institutions  located  in the  country  of residence  of thw user  of the  service.
Most commonly,  this  investment  is  in the  form  of locally-owned  subsidiaries  or
branches. The issue  here  is  not  liberalization  of the  capital  account,  but  the
3  For  example,  much  financial  intermediation  in  Venezuela  has  historically
been carried  out  offshore,  through  banks  in  Miami  and the  Caribbean. Another
example  is  situations  in  which  surplus  countries  have  exported  capital  at  the
same  time  as  they  are  borrowing  abroad:  in  Botswana,  for  example,  major  projects
are  mostly  not  funded  through  the  domestic  financial  system,  although  it  has  a
surplus  of  loanable  funds.4
treatment  afforded  by host-country  regulatory  authorities  to foreign  banking
affiliates. 4
B.  OwnershiR  of Banks
Attitudes  towards  licencing  foreign ,aks  and  other  financial  institutions
vary  widely  across  developing  countries.  Some  totally  exclude  foreign  financial
institutions;  others  permit representative  offices  but not bran'l-les.  Tne
Bahamas,  Bahrain,  Hong Kong, Panama  and Singapore  view exports  of financial
services  as a source  of employment  and  foreign  exchang-,  and  in a few,  usually
sm'  1,  developing  countries  foreign  institutions  account  for  nearly  all  financial
e-  . Table 1  shows  the range of  experience.  The  three foreign banks
operating  in Botswana  hold all commercial  banking  assets,  although  there  are
several  smaller  indigenous  non-bank  intermediaries  which take deposits,  make
loans or do both.  In Malaysia  (which  has traditla.:lly  iiLad  an  open  policy
towards  the  financial  system)  sixteen  foreign  banks  account  for  one  quarter  of
banking  assets;  in the  Philippines,  Chile  and  Kenya  the  share  of foreign  banks
was also appreciable. In Nigeria  foreign  shareholdings  in banks have been
tightly  limited,  to create  a  class of co-owned  enterprises;  in Tanzania,  a
foreign-owned  banking system was  nationalized  after  independence.  The
representative  country  of table  1  had  eight  foreign  banks,  which  held 6  percent
of system  assets.
4  An important  ' sue for  licensing  policy  is whether  to allow foreign
branches  or  subsidiarie .r  both.  Countries  differ  in  this  regard. For  example,
Botswana  allows  foreign  subsidiaries,  but  not  branches,  whereas  Uruguay  permits
branches.  In  Canada,  financial  reforms  have,  in  effect,  brought  about  conversion
of foreign  banking  operations  from  branch  to subsidiary  operations,  with  both
positive  and  negative  effects  for  the  banks  concerned.5
Table  1.  Foreign  Commercial  Banks  in  DeveloRing  Country  Markets
Number  of  Percentage  share  in
Country  and  date  foreign  banks  total  bank  assets
Argentina - 1987  32  20
Bangladesh - 1986  7  6
Bolivia - 1987  3  3
Botswana - 1986/1987  3  100
Brazil - 1987  17  6
Chile - 1987  21  17
Colombia  8  6
Indonesia - 1986/1987  10  6
Kenya - 1986/1987  11  37
Malaysia - 1988  16  25
Nepal - 1988*  3  6
Nigeria - 1987/1988*  15  74
Pakistan - 1987/1988  20  12
Peru - 1987  5  2
Philippines - 1986/1987  4  19
Senegal - 1986/1987  2  4
Thailand - 1988  14  4
Tunisia - 1985  7  1
Turkey - 1986/1987  18  4
Uruguay - 1987  8  10
Venezuela - 1987  3  1
Median  8  6
*  Joint  Venture  Foreign  Banks
Source: World  Bank  Reports.6
Historically, the  establishment of  branches and  subsidiaries  by
international  banks  followed  closely  the  location  of  major  international  clients
and the finance 4  trade.  Today, the main activities  of foreign  banking
affiliates  in  developing  countries  are  still  largely  in  these  areas,  even  though
the  doubling  of international  bank lending  that  has taken  p.ace  since  1980  has
occurred  against  a  background  of  virtually  no increase  in  world  trade.
The  case  of  Uruguay  illustrates  another  common  characteristic  of  developing
countries--the  overwhelming  presence  of government  in many domestic  banking
systems.  In Uruguay the indigenous  banking system is, in fact, totally
government-owned  as  a  result  of  the  rescue  operation  mounted  by the  authorities
in the mid-1980s.  In India,  Tanzania,  and in many other countries,  the
indigenous  banking  system  is state-owned  because  of nationalization.  Even in
free-market  Chile,  government's  effective  participation  in  the  financial  system
through  the Banco  del Estado  is about  25 percent. This implies  that in  many
cases trade liberalization  in banking  ser-ices--as  in certain  other service
sectors--might  amount,  in  effect;  to breaking  a government  monopoly. In  most
African  countries,  banks  are  either  government  owned  or  foreign  owned. Nigeria
was  the  only  country  in  Africa  to  develop  indigenous  commercial  banks  before  the
late  1940s.
Although  there  are  some  exceptions,  foreign  banks  are  much  less  likely  than
domestic  banks  to  have  an exteT,sive  branch  network. This  implies  that  they  are
usu&lly  more  dependent  on  wholesale  funds  or  on funds  from  abroad  anl  that  they
are  more  likely  to  provide  services  to  larger  clients  in  the  main  urban  center-
than to small  farmers. The cost  structure  of foreign  banking  affiliates  may
therefore differ quite significantly  from that of  indigenous  banks.  In
particular,  they may have a higher cost of funds because  of fewer  demand7
deposits,  but  have  far  fewer  staff  per  unit  of  assets. They  may  aLso  rely  more
on fee-based  income.
This  bias  towards  larger  clients--and  in  most cases,  toward  subsidiaries
of  multinational  corporations-  -segments  the  financial  markets  and  clearly  limits
the benefits that might immediately  be  derived from the presence of a
sophisticated,  and  perhaps  relatively  more  efficient,  financial  intermediary. 5
Many residents  of the  host country  who are  clients  of foreign  bank affiliates
might  in  any  case  have  had  access  to  the  banking  services  from  the  corresponding
bank  headquarters  abroad. Conversely,  smaller  savers  and  borrowers  may  be left
as captives  of the indigenous  financial  intermediaries,  and their range  of
products  and services.  But it is also true that the threat of foreign
competition,  even  if  only  for  a  limited  sphere  of  business,  may  cause  domestic
intermediaries  to improve  their  services  e'nd  products.
The impact  of tne  entry  of foreign  rinancial  institutions  on the  balance
of payments  is not clear.6  On the positive  side, these institutions  may
stimulate  inflows  of capital,  including  funds  to establish  their  own capital
bases  if  they  are  subsidiaries;  they  may  also  act  as  a  conduit  for  foreign  funds,
especially  if the international  standing  of indigenous  banks  is inadequate  to
sustain  correspondent  relationships;  and  they  may  be  able  to  supply  services  that
would otherwise  have to be imported. On the  negative  side,  it is sometimes
5  A common  argument  for  multinationalization  of  banking  cites  the  benefits
to be derived from integrating  capital and fi-ancial  markets.  Terms and
availability  of credit  will not necessarily e equalized  within different
countries.
6  This  is  true  even  without  considering  t  ,;complex  problems  resulting  from
the  protection  of  an input--such  as  the  financial  services--that  is intensively
used by the productive  sectors  of the economy.  See "A General  Equilibrium
Approach."8
alleged  that foreign  banking  affiliates  facilitate  the export  of capital  in
circumstances  in  which  foreign  returns  exceed  domestic  returns  or  there  are  major
uncertainties  facing  domestic  savers. 7
C.  Banking  Systems  in  Develolng Countries
The above discussiot,  takes fo- granted  that the main function  of the
financial services industry is to provide financial services to clients
efficiently  and on a  more or less  competitive  basis.  But  this is  not true  in
all countries.  There are importait  differen.-  .etween  the industrial  and
developing  countries  and  very  large  differences  among  developing  countries  that
bear  on the  question  of liberalizing  entry.
Role
Despite some trend towards  reform, in a  large number of developing
countries,  financial  intermediaties  are  still  expected  to  distribute  subsidies
by means of below-market  credit, to cross-subsidize  across  clients,  and to
finance  the  government  through  forced  investments  and  high  reserve  requirements.
This role may be part of broad development  policy,  or it may be imposed  to
satisfy  special  interests.  To give  some  idea  of the  size  of such  impositions,
subsidies  to government  and  others  through  financial  systems  frequently  amount
to 3-4  percent  of GNP  and  may reach  7-8  percent  of GNP--this  for a sector  in
which  normal  value  added  amounts  to only  5-6  percent  of GNP. For  a set  of ten
developing  countries  the  inflation  tax  averaged  2.6  percent  of  GNP  in  1987  (World
7  According  to  IMF  data,  over  1981-87  gross  flows  of  foreign  investment  to
developing  countries  were $118 billion,  but net flows,  taking  into account
dividend remittances,  were negative $10 billion.  For non-oil developing
countries,  gross  and  net  flows  were  $85  billion  and  $21  billion,  respectively.9
Bank (1989),  box 4.5);  the inflation  tax in developed  countries  is typically
below  1  percent  of  GNP.
There  is inevitably  some  conflict  between  these  objectives  and  the  entry
of  foreign  banks  that  expect  to  operate  according  to  the  principles  of  their  home
countries. Foreign  banks  will  expect  to  hold  and  price  assets  on the  basis  of
risk and return,  rather than according to government  direction.  Indeed,
governments  are  sometimes  reluctant  to  permit  entry  because  they  recognize  that
it  will  be more  difficult  to  persuade  foreign  institutions  to  fall  in  line  with
their  objectives.
Condition
Technical  insolvency  is  widespread  among  financial  systems  in developing
countries. Although  it is not possible  to obtain  a complete  picture  of the
situation  of  banks  in  either  industrial  or  developing  cour.tries,  there  is  little
doubt  that insolvency  problems  loom  far  larger  in the  latter. These  problems
are often  not apparent,  owing  to inadequate  systems  of prudential  regulation
and  supervision,  but  when  they  surface  (sometimes  as a  liquidity  crisis),  it  is
not  uncommon  for  losses  to  amount  to  a  multiple  of  the  capital  of  intermediaries
and  to a  sizeable fraction of  (GDP)--from  a  few percentage  points to,
occasionally,  25  percent.
In  general,  financial liberalization increases stress  on  ailing
intermediaries.  The  entry  of  new  and  more  efficient  financial  institutions  that
are not burdened  with portfolio  problems  tends  to further  undercut  existing,
distressed,  financial  institutions.  To compensate  for  loan  losses,  the  latter
must  try  to  recover  income  from  good  clients  by raising  spreads  and  charges  (as
occurred  with  the  savings  and  loan  industry  in  the  US). But  they  are  likely  to10
face severe  competition  from new entrants  not burdened  with bad loans.  Of
course,  the  objective  of liberalizing  markets  and opening  them  up to foreign
entry is precisely to cause stress  to established  firms through increased
competition.  But  this  needs  to  be  handled  carefully  in  the  case  of  banks;  large
losses  by depositors  are invariably  unacceptable,  and it will finally  be the
government  which  will  have to  bear  the  loss.
II.  Protectionism
Protectionism  in  banking  services  may  be  defined  as  the  absence  of  equality
of competitive  opportunities  for  foreign  vis-a-vis  domestic  banks.  This  can
occur  through  exchange  controls  or restrictions  on foreign  investment.
Exchange  restrictions  typically  constrain  domestic  savers  from  acquiring
financial  assets  abroad  (although  external  debt  problems  have  led  to  constraints
on  domestic  borrowers,  as  well). Pension  and  life  insurance  funds  in  developing
countries  typically  cannot  save abroad  and therefore  cannot  be serviced  by
foreign  investment  firms. Capital  restrictions  may also  prevent  institutions
located  in  foreign  countries  from  offering  other  types  of  services.  For  example,
it  may  be difficult  for  a foreign  institution  to  underwrite  a  domestic  security
issue  in  the  presence  of exchange  controls. (It  should  be noted  that  for  much
of the postwar  period, most industrialized  countries  have also maintained
exchange  controls.)
Restrictions  to the  establishment  of foreign  banking  affiliates  take  the
form  of  discriminatory  barriers to  entry  and  discriminatory  ojerating
constraints. The issue  concerning  entry  is  not the  existence  of barriers  Ver
se;  with  rare  exceptions  entry  into  domestic  banking  sectors  has  historically
not been free in any country.  In liberalized,  market-based  systems,  entry11
restrictions  typically  specify  minimum  capital  requirements,  management  integrity
and  competence.  In other  systems,  entry  restrictions  are  varied,  ranging  from
absolute  prohibition  of  any foreign presence, to limitations  on capital
participation  in  domestic  institutions.
There  are  many  ways in  which  operating  constraints  affect  the  ability  of
foreign  banking  affiliates  to compete  with domestic  banks.  For example,  they
may influence  the affiliates'  funding  possibilities  by mandating  differertial
access  to  the  Central  Bank  discount  window,  prohibiting  the  receipt  of  deposits
from  the  public,  limiting  the  number  and  location  of  branches. National  banks
may  handle  all  government  and  parastatal  business,  which  assures  them  of large
volumes  of  low-cost  deposits.  Government  may  not  require  dividend  payments  from
nationalized  banks, 8 and  they  may  impose  special  requirements  on  the  nationality
of top  management  and  directors.  They  may  constrain  the  type  of services  that
can  be offered,  and  so on.
Operational  constraints  can further  be classified  as  intentional  and
accidental  (see  appendix  A for  examples). Intentional  operational  constraints
explicitly  discriminate  against  foreign  banking  affiliates.  They  are  frequently
designed  to limit  foreign  bank  operations  to  certain  segments  of the  financial
market  while  preserving  other  segments  entirely  for  indigenous  banks.  A.ccidental
operational  constraints  are those regulations  or national economic  policy
measures  which,  even  though  applied  equally  to  foreign  and  indigenous  banks,  have
a differential  and  negative  impact  on the  ability  of foreign  banks  to compete
in the host-country  banking  market  because  of the  different  nature  of their
8  In Uruguay,  for example,  the National  Bank,  which accounts  for about
seventy  percent  of the  system's  assets,  handles  all  government  accounts  and is
not  required  to  pay dividends. Reforms  in these  areas  are a prerequisite  for
the  evolution  of a competitive  financial  system.12
operations.9 One of the most common  constraints  of this kind emerges  from
maximum  permissible  asset/capital  ratios  and limits  on the size of loans  to
individual  borrowers  relative  to  capital.  Both  of  these  constraints  are  imposed
by  most  countries for  prudential reasons, to  ensure minimum levels of
capitalization  and  portfolio  diversification  and so enhance  the  safety  of the
institutions.  Also  for  prudential  reasons,  many  nations  treat  foreign  banking
affiliates  in the host-country  as independent  entities.  This means that
asset/capital  ratios  and lending  limits  are  based exclusively  on the foreign
banking  affiliate's  capital  which  is  typically  just  a  small  fraction  of  the  total
capital  of the  parent  organization.  As a result,  their  volume  of operationts
and individual  loan  sizes  can  be seriously  constrained.
In other  cases,  competitive  inequities  result  from  measures  related  to
general  economic  and balance  of payments  policies.  Given the international
orientation  of foreign  banking  affiliates'  operations,  limitations  on foreign
exchange  transactions  have a greater  negative  effect  on them than oai  their
domestic  counterparts.  Many  developing  countries  control  the  expansion  of  credit
through  bank-by-bank  credit  ceilings  rather  than  through  broad  tools  of  monetary
policy  such  as open-market  operations.  Such  measures  discriminate  against  new
entrants,  and  against  banks  with  limited  branch  networks  if  allocations  are  made
on the basis of deposits  collected.  This constraint  is not always  easy to
9  This  notion  is linked  to  the  concept  of effective  market  access,  which
emerged  in  the  context  of the  Uruguay  Round  midterm  review. This  concept  seems
to  be related  to two issues:  (a)  the  potential  differential  impact  on foreign
and  domestic  institutions  of a highly  regulated  host-country  environment,  and
(b)  the  potential  market  distortions  created  by  differences  in  the  laxity  of  the
regulatory  framework  for  banking  services  in  the  host-country  vis-a-vis  the  home-
country. The  former  issue  implies  that  in  a  highly  regulated  environment  it  may
be more difficult  to  achieve  national  treatment  for  foreign  banking  affiliates
than  in  a  more  open  system. TX.  second  calls  for  the  harmonization  of  regulatory
structures,  as discussed  later.13
abolish.  Concerns  about  losing  control  over  monetary  and  credit  policy  if  direct
controls  are  given  up  are  related  to  the  level  of sophistication  of  the  domestic
financial  system  and in  some  cases  are  well-founded.
Some  governments  have  deliberately  reduced  competitive  inequities  affecting
foreign  banking  affiliates  by applying  regulatory  requirements  flexibly  or by
granting  the  affiliates  privileges  not  extended  to  domestic  banks. For  example,
foreign  banks  might  be  exempt  from  onerous  obligations  to  lend  to  small  farmers,
because  of their  limited  branch  networks.1 0 In  some  cases,  measures  that  apply
equally  to both groups  of competitors  can  have a favorable  impact  on foreign
banking  affiliates  because  of  the  nature  of  their  operations.  All  these  measures
may  be classified  as  preferential  treatment  measures. (See  appendix  A).
As  in  the  cases  of  minimum  capital/asset  ratios,  or  maximum  lending  limits
discussed  above,  many  other  constraints  to  banking  operations  are  of  a  prudential
nature,  especially  in  developed  countries.  Prudential  regulations  establish  the
outside  limits  and  constraints  placed  on  banks  to  ensure  the  safety  and  soundness
of the  banking."  The issue  then is not with the constraints  themselves  but
equality  of treatment  between  foreign  and  domestic  banks. This  is  the  national
treatment  princivle  discussed  at the Montreal  meeting.  In most developing
countries,  however,  national  treatment  does  not  prevail,  and,  in  many  of these
10 In  such  cases,  foreign  banks  might  need  to  deposit  an equivalent  amount
of  funds  into  a  low-interest  account  at  the  central  bank. If  loan  losses  on  farm
loans  are  high (as  is  frequently  the  case),  the  penalty  of low  interest  may  be
preferable  to lending.
"1  The  key components  of a banking  prudential  regulatory  framework  focus
on licensing  and other  corporate,  exposure  limits,  loans  to insiders,  capital
adequacy,  asset  classification  and  provisioning,  submission  of false  financial
information  by borrowers,  enforcement  powers,  treatment  of problem  and  failed
banks,  permissible  or prohibited  activities,  and scope,  frequency  and content
of audit programs.  For a comprehensive  description  of these aspects see
Polizatto  (1999).14
countries,  the  regulatory  framework  is  not  transparent  which  worsens  the  problem.
For  example,  certain  countries  have  no explicit  policy  of  not licensing  foreign
banks,  yet no foreign  banks  have  been licensed  for 20 years.  This important
dimension  of liberalization-  -transpareny  of regulation-  -has  been  emphasized  by
representatives  of industrial  countries.  In this context,  transparency  is
defined  as the  ability  of all  participants  in  a  market  to have  equal  knowledge
of and  access  to regulatory  and  legal  changes. 12
In some cases, difficulties  in achieving  nondiscriminatory  treatment
between domestic  and foreign  participants  are the outcome  of significantly
different  foreign  and  domestic  banking  structures. (Any  constraints  resulting
from such differential  structures  would  be classified  as maccidental".) For
example,  in the United  States,  banking  and commercial  activities  are largely
separated,  as are  banking  and securities  activities  by the  Glass-Steagall  Act
(1932),  but in  many  other  countries,  commercial  activities  may  be conducted  by
companies  affiliated  with banks  and  banks can operate  in securities  markets.
This  has  made it  difficult  to implement  the  U.S.  policy  of national  treatment
with respect  to direct  investment  by foreign  banking  organizations  and their
nonbanking  affiliates.
As noted  above,  foreign  ownership  of banking  institutions  is frequently
a politically  sensitive  topic  in  developing  countries. This is especially  so
when the  banking  industry  is  seen  as  a  policy  arm  of the  ge-rernment,  which  can
exert  far  greater  control  and  moral  suasion  over  national  institutions,  but it
is  also  a  result  of  the  banks'  role  in  implementing  monetary  policy  and  financing
government  out of seigniorage. Banks  are typically  not popular  institutions
12  Bankers  frequently  complain  about  changes  in  regulations  that  take  place
without  their  knowledge  or advice.15
(many  ethical  systems  have an aversion  to interest),  and in some  cases  a fear
of foreign  banking  affiliates  is said to add to the unpopularity  of banks,
regardless  of nationality.  The  poor financial  condition  of many indigenous
financial  institutions  is also an invitation  to protection  by governments
unprepared  to face  the  fiscal  cost  of financial  reform.
III.  Political  Economy  and  Welfare  Asgects
Sagari (1989)  has shown  that skilled  labor  is a source  of comparative
advantage  in  financial  services. This  explains  why  the  United  States,  which  is
well-endowed  with  skilled  labor  wishes  to  extend  GATT  to financial  (and  other)
services,  and why developing  countries  have given  a less than enthusiastic
welcome  to  such  proposal.  Within  the  principal  industrial  economies--which  in
general  are interested  in liberalization--inclusion  of finance  in the  GATT is
probably  less  relevant  for  smaller  banks  than  for  the  major  multinational  banks.
The  issue  of the  potential  gains  for  developing  countries  from  free  trade
in financial  services  is  clearly  complex. Major  developing  country  banks  often
have branches  in the  main  money  centers  to effect  payments  speedily,  to fund
positions  in  foreign  currencies  through  the  interbank  markets  and  in  some  cases
(such  as the  Banco  do Brasil)  to  attract  short-term  credit  to  help  support  the
balance  of payments. Develop1.ng  country  nationals  also  manage  in a number  of
international  banks,  such  as  the  Bank  of  Credit  and  Commerce,  Librabank,  Bladex,
and Arlabank.  Banks from certain  countries  such as Thailand  and Korea are
starting  to  show  signs  of  moving  into  industrial  country  markets,  and  it  was  not
so  long  ago  that  Japanese  banks,  now  major  international  players,  confined  their
operations  to their  home  country. These  examples  suggest  that  there  is a real
possibility  that  developing  countries  can  export  banking  services.  Further,  the16
dynamic  efficiency  gains  forced  by opening  domestic  markets  to  competition  will
probably  be needed  to spur  developing country  banks to try to export  their
services. However,  for  most  developing  countries,  the  potential  gains  from  the
opening  of banking  are still  seen to be those  deriving  from the  presence  of
foreign  banking  affiliates  in their  markets.
A  general  eauilibrium  approach.  An  in-depth  cost/benefit  analysis  of  this
tnpic  should,  of course,  take  into  account  the  fact  that  financial  services  are
largely  intermediates.  This increases  the  already  large  problem  of measuring
their  quantity  and  quality.  In  principle,  the  effects  of  protecting  intermediate
services  are  similar  to  those  of increasing  the  cost  of intermediate  goods  such
as  steel. Some  authors  (for  example  Bhagwati,  1987)  have  argued  that  in  the  case
of financial  services  the  negative  effects  may  even  be more  severe  than  in  that
of goods.  In denying  access  to efficient  banking  services,  the protective
policies  may  deny  domestic  exporters  of  goods  access  not  only  to  cheaper  credit,
but  to  the  entire  vector  of  services--such  as  hedging  facilities  and  swaps--that
modern  international  banks can  provide  to facilitate  international  commerce.
General  equilibrium  welfare  analysis  of protection  suggests  that barriers  to
trade in financial  services  result in inefficiencies  in the allocation  of
productive  resources,  distorted  consumption  patterns,  and  significant  static  and
dynamic  welfare  losses.  Over  time,  the  impact  of  liberalizing  trade  in  financial
services  can be substantial  in breaking  down established  oligopolistic  and
corporatist  structures  and stimulating  change  in other sectors.  It will be
especially  interesting  to  observe  the  experience  of  Europe  in  the  1990s.23 But,
as discussed  above,  to  the  extent  that  the  clients  which  benefit  from  the  local
13  A proposal  for  the  rules  governing  banking  in the  EC is  summarized  in
Appendix  B.17
presence  of foreign  banking  affiliates  are  largely  enterprises  which  could  have
accessed  the  similar  services  in international  markets,  overall  welfare  gains
may  be smaller.
The critical  question  is therefore  the extent  to which foreign  banking
affiliates  can constitute  an actual  or potential  source  of competition,  and
reduce  the  power  and  wastefulness  of  national  banking  oligopolies.  The  answer,
as  well  as  the  willingness  of  host-country  authorities  to  welcome  foreign  banking
affiliates  may  well  be dependent  on  tie  relative  degree  of  sophistication  of  the
indigenous  banks,  and their  desire  to  become  more active  internationally.  In
less  sophisticated  markets,  it is likely  that  foreign  multinational  banks  will
not  upset  the  prevailing  level  of  competition  in  most retail  markets,  and  will
merely  insert  themselves  into  typical  market  niches.
This  points  to  a  general  characteristic  of  direct  foreign  investment:  that
gains  are  less  likely  when  markets  remain  oligopolistic  and  segmented  and  are
most  likely  when  foreign  entry  contributes  to  a  effective  increase  in  the  number
of competitive  firms  or,  perhaps,  the  breaking  of a government  monopoly. The
extent  to which opening  the  banking  industry  will  have such  a favorable,  and
widely  felt,  impact  va.ies  considerably  between  developing  countries.
However,  foreign  banking  affiliates  can also  make a significant  dynamic
contribution  to the development  of domestic  financial  markets.  They can
introduce  modern,  sophisticated  banking  techniques  and  systems  more  quickly  than
many indigenous  institutions  can develop them.  Foreign banks frequently
innovate. For  example,  they  have introduced  a  bankers'  acceptances  market  in
Spain,  credit  cards  and  ATM's  in  some  countries,  and  so on.  In  some  countries,
such as Kenya, foreign  banks have established  venture capital affiliates.
Another important  contribution  of  foreign banks is on-the-job  management18
training.  Managers  of  indigenous  banks  in  developing  countries  are  increasingly
drawn  from  the  ranks  of  host  country  nationals  who  have  risen  to  executive  level
in  foreign  banks. The  experience  of  these  nationals  combines  exposure  to  modern
banking  techniques  with  understanding  of the  local  market. In the  longer  run,
this infusion  of skills  might  be the most important  spinoff  to the entry  of
foreign  banks,  especially  given  the  difficulty  that  most  developing  country  banks
would  now face  in  trying  to  establish  themselves  in  developed  markets.
IV.  An Analysis  of Liberalization  Options
The full  liberalization  of banking  and  financial  services  requires  both
free  capital  movements  and  non-discriminatory  entry  and  operating  conditions  for
foreign  banking  affiliates  as  compared  with  indigenous  banks. Allowing  foreign
financial  institutions  to offer  their  services  to residents  of a country  is  of
little  use if such operations  are subject  to conditions  that preclude  all
competition  with indigenous  institutions,  and  limit  profitability.
Total  liberalization  would  also  require-  -and,  indeed,  exert  strong  pressure
for--the  harmonization  of  national  legislation  and  policies  which  determine  the
operating  environment  of financial  intermediaries.  Differences  in regulatory
standards  are  likely  to  translate  into  a  competitive  advantage  for  banks  subject
to  a  particular  regulatory  regime. However,  harmonization  is  difficult;  it  can
be expected  that each country  will prefer  its own system.  The politically
sensitive  nature  of the  financial  sector  slows  the  process  of  modifying  banking
laws and regulations,  which is subject  to lengthy  and complicated  political
debates.  The process followed  by the European  Economic  Community  in its19
integration  efforts  offers  examples  of some  of these  difficulties.1 4 Santomero
(1989)  notes that the United States itself  had a  tradition  of regulation
centering  on product  restrictions  and geographic  limitations,  resulting  in a
fragmented  industry  with  an  excessive  number  of  participants.  He describes  the
'long  and  tortuous  road'  followed  by the  industry  in  its  efforts  to  move  closer
to full  interstate  banking.
The case of the developing  countries  is even  more complex:  few have a
tradition  of free capital  movements  and the  foreign  debt crisis  has rendered
their  foreign  exchange  problems  even  more serious. Their indigenous  banking
systems  have frequently  grown  within  a framework  of distorted  signals,  due  to
a  combination  of  protection  and  governments'  use  of the  banks  as instruments  to
achieve  non-economic  targets. In most,  p.-udential  regulation  and supervision
are woefully inadequate.  In such circumstances,  adjustment  to a  fully
competitive  setting  cannot  be too  abrupt. The  speed  of  adjustment  will  reflect
the costs of reorganization,  of learning,  and in general,  of developing  new
instruments  and practices  within  institutions.1 5 Liberalization  of domestic
financial  markets  may need to take  precedence  over liberalization  of capital
movements  (i.e.  external  liberalization).  Blejer  and Sagari  (1987)  elaborate
on the issues  of sequencing  in financial  liberalization.  What is needed  are
1'  For  instance,  as of  April  1989,  only  four  European  countries--Denmark,
the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany,  the  Netherlands,  and  the  United  Kingdom--had
fully  liberalized  capital  movements  with respect  to  both  other  EEC  members  and
third  countries.  France  still  prohibited  nonbank  residents  not involved  in
international  commercial  activities  from  holding  deposits  at banks in foreign
countries  or  holding  foreign  currency  deposits,  other  than  those  denominated  in
ECUs,  at  banks  in France.
15  For  an  example  of the  magnitude  of  institutional  reforms  needed  by large
Indonesian  banks,  see  World  Bank (1989),  box 7.5.20
evolutionary  mechanisms  within  which  steady  and  phased  adjustment  of national
policies  and institutions  can  take  place. 16
Another  issue  related  to  the  opening  of  the  capital  account  is  a  propensity
of international  lenders  to pursue  developing  country  governments  to assume
ultimate  responsibility  for  the  debts  of the  private  sector. The  case  of  Chile
in  the  1980s  provides  an interesting  example.
Given  the unique  characteristics  of financial  services,  is the  Uruguay
Round the right forum to discuss  the liberalization?" 7 When the GATT was
established  in  1948,  banking  was  explicitly  excluded  from  its  mandate. But  the
principles  and concepts  of the GATT--for  example, the national treatment
principle  discussed  above  -- might  form  part  of  a  general  framework  for  agreements
pertinent to trade in financial  services.  Moreover, the GATT codes and
principles  are selective,  gradual  in process,  and flexible  enough  to allow  a
great  degree  of bilateral  adjustment  and  communication,  which  will be crucial
in  negotiations  on services.
The problem  with the  Uruguay  Round  forum  is the importance  of the  legal
and  regulatory  framework  in  shaping  financial  systems,  and  the  highly  specialized
knowledge  needed  to modify  and  harmonize  different  countries'  frameworks.  An
alternative,  and  perhaps  a natural  complement  to GATT,  is  negotiate  trade  and
investment  issues  in the  financial  sector  in an international  forum  supported
16  Even  in the  case  of the  EEC,  the  accession  treaties  of the  new  member
states  (Greece,  Portugal,  and Spain)  provide  for derogations  or time lags in
which  to implement  the  directives  in  the  area  of freeing  capital  movements.
17  The U.S. position  has clearly  been to prefer  augmenting  the GATT to
include  services. By contrast,  the group  of ten developing  countries  led  by
Brazil  and  India  wished  to separate  any  potential  services  agreement  from  the
GATT.  Within this approach,  the negotiations  would be undertaken  by the
governments  themselves,  not  by the  GATT  contracting  parties.21
by agreements  among  the  pertinent  Central  Banks. For  example,  the  Basle  risk-
based  capital  framework  constitutes  an  accord  among  the  banking  authorities  of
the  major  industrial  countries  rather  than  a formal  international  agreement  or
treaty.  Bringing  the developing  world on board will probably  require  the
progressive  replacement  of  national  laws  and  regulations  with  those  promoted  by
this  international  agency.  These  measures  could  then  be  enforced  by  the  natioral
authorities.
But  such  regulatory  harmonization  can  not  be expected  to  be successfully
implemented  within  a short  time.  A promising  approach  may be that  adopted  by
the EC:  mutual recognition,  whereby each country recognizes  the laws,
regulations,  and  administrative  practices  of other  member  states  as  equivalent
to its  own.  This approach  precludes  the  use  of differences  in  national  rules
as a means  of restricting  access. Clearly,  however,  a prerequisite  to mutual
recognition  is  the  harmonization  of  the  most  essential  aspects  of  legal  systems,
statutory  provisions,  and  regulatory  and  supervisory  practices.
Moreover,  as discussed  above,  the distinction  between  the  provision  of
financial  services  by subsidiaries  of foreign  banks,  on one hand, and their
provision  through  bzenches  or  across  borders  on  the  other  hand,  may  be  pertinent
to  the  design  of  the  preferred  approach. In  the  case  of  the  European  Community,
operations  of subsidiaries  of financial  firms  headquartered  in other  member
states  will  continue  to  be  covered  by the  principle  of  national  treatment;  that
is,  subsidiaries  of  foreign  financial  institutions  are  treated  in  the  same  manner
as other  incorporated  entities  in  the  host state. This  "dual"  solution  is.  to
a  certain  extent,  counter-intuitive,  since  at  least  in  the  short-run,  it  is  bound
to bring  about  some  competitive  inequalities  and fragmentation  of markets,  in
contrast  to the objectives  supposed  to be achieved  though  "liberalization".22
However,  over the longer  run it is expected  that market  forces  will create
pressure  on  governments  that  will  lead  to  the  convergence  of  those  national  rules
and  practices  that  have  not  been  explicitly  harmonized  at the  EC level.
Nonetheless,  one  should  be careful  not to  overestimate  the  applicability
of the experience  of the EC to a global approach to multilateral  trade
negotiations on  services.  The  economic, institutional  and  political
characteristics  of the  EC differ  greatly  from  those  that  might  be observed  in
a grouping  that  includes  both  developed  and  developing  countries.  EC  decisions
are made in the context  of a fairly  powerful  supranational  legislature  and
judiciary  to which the member  states  have already  transferred  a significant
degree  of  sovereignty  and  of  acceptance  of  the  prevalence  of  Community  law  over
national  law.
V.  Conclusions
The  United  States'  proposal  for  the  liberalization  of trade  in  financial
services  has met  with a response  varying  from  cautious  to hostile  on the  part
of  developing  countries. As with  other  sectors,  to some  extent  this  reflects
concern  over  the  perceived  comparative  advantage  of  industrial  countries  and  the
power  of strong  vested  interests,  including  the  interests  of  governments,  which
may seek  to  use the  financial  system  as an instrument  of  public  policy,  rather
than a market-based  intermediary. But it also reflects  recognition  of the
peculiar  situation  Af  the  banking  industry  in  many  developing  countries.  In  some
countries  there  is essentially  no banking  industry  in the  sense  understood  in
industrial  countries;  in many, much of the banking sector is technically
insolvent, and  massive and  costly efforts are  needed  to  restructure
intermediaries'  balance  sheets,  reform  the  management  of  banks,  and  improve--or23
indeed,  build-  -systems  of  prudential  supervision  and  regulation.  These  measures
are  frequently  necessary  before  financial  systems  can  operate  on  a  market  basis,
but they cannot  be effected  immediatelY. The opening  of borders  to foreign
competition,  while  it  is  an  important  and  necessary  part  of  liberalization,  must
proceed  in line  with  wide ranging  domestic  reforms,  which,  'n  many developing
countries,  must  proceed  at a  moderate  pace.24
Appendix  A.  Discriminatory  Operating  Constraints
Constraints  that  discriminatorily  affect  the  operations  of foreign  banks
once  established  in  the  host-country's  markets  may  impede  the  ability  of  foreign
banking  affiliates  (FBAs)  to  compete  with  domestic  banks  in several  ways.  For
instance,  they  may  increase  their  cost  of  funds  or  their  g  neral  operating  costs,
in  relation  to  those  of  domestic  competitors  or  may  constrain  expansion  of  their
operations  within  the  country. The  U.S. Department  of the  Treasury  Report  to
Congress  on  Foreign  Government  Treatment  of  U.S.  Commercial  Banking  Organizations
(1979) suggests  that these regulations  can  be  grouped into three types:
intentional  operational  constraints,  accidental  operational  constraints,  and
preferential  treatment  measures. We  have further  divided  each  of  these  sets  of
regulations  according  to  the  facets  of  banking  activity  they  affect.
A.  Intentional  Operational  Constraints
Constraints  that  are  established  explicitly  to  discriminate  against  foreign
banks  are  common  in  developing  countries. In  many  cases  such  constraints  are
designed  to limit  foreign  bank  operations  to  certain  segments  of the  financial
market,  while  preserving  other  segments  entirely  for  local  banks.
Regulations  related  to grivate  sources  of funds  are among the  most
prevalent  intentional  operational  constraints.  They  restrict  FBAs'  solicitation
of  some  kinds  of  deposits--for  example,  retail  deposits,  or  deposits  of  specific
business  sectors--or  limit  borrowing  from non-banks.  Deposits  are one of a
bank's lowest-cost  sources  of funds,  and to the extent  that deposit-taking
restrictions  force  foreign  banks  to use  more expensive  sources,  the  result  is
a significant  competitive  disadvantage  for  these  banks.25
Frequently,  the  government's  policy  is  to  hold  its  own  financial  accounts
exclusively  with indigenous  institutions,  in  many  cases  government-owned  ones.
Among  other  consequences,  this  provides  a comparative  advantage  to those  banks
typically  by making  available  to them  large  volumes  of low  cost  deposits.
Regulations  that affect  the number  or location  of FBAs limit  the
sources  that  FBAs  can tap  for  local  deposits. The combination  of constraints
on acceptance  of certain  types of deposits  and on the expansion  of branch
networks  severely  restricts  FBAs'  access  to  inexpensive  local  sources  of  funds. 18
Regulations  that  affect  FBAs'  access  to  central  bank  discount  facilities
are rather  common.  They put FBAs at a  disadvantage  in dealing  with their
liquidity  needs,  generally  forcing  them to hold a larger  proportion  of their
assets  in lower  yield  reserves.
Restrictions  on the services  that FBAs can offer.  other  than those
related  to  deposit-taking  and  lending  make  it  difficult  for  FBAs  to  expand  their
market  share  because  they cannot  offer  the full line of services  offered  by
domestic  banks. Frequently  seen  examples  of these  restrictions  have  to  do  with
security  management  and underwriting  business,  limits  for  guarantees,  and  the
types  of currencies  that  FBAs  can  deal  in.
Restrictions  related  to  the  loan  and  security  portfolio  may  limit  the
type  of  borrowers  FBAs  can  service  or  may  force  them  to  hold  a  larger  proportion
of their  loan  portfolios  in low-yielding  longex  term  loans  than  is required  of
domestic  banks.
?8  In some cases  official  pressures  go in the  other direction,  forcing
foreign  bankers  to  branch  into  specific  regions  more  widely  and  more  quickly  than
they  consider  economically  reasonable.26
Tax-related  regulations  normally  lead  to  higher  costs  of  doing  business.
Examples  are  a tax  rate  on foreign  branch  profits  remitted  to the  parent  bank
larger  than  the  tax  rate  on  dividends,  the  analogous  payment  for  domestic  banks,
exemptions  for domestic  banks  of withholding  taxes  on interest  paid to non-
residents,  and  so on.
Sundry  oRerational  constraints  explicitly  discriminate  against  FBAs.
For  example,  ceilings  on  the  annual  repatriation  of  FBAs'  profits,  differential
initial  capital  requirements,  differential  foreign  currency  reserve  requirements,
restrictions  on  the  sources  of funds  for  capital  increases,  restrictions  on  the
ability to hold  liens on  real property, arid  regulations  concerning the
nationality  of  FBA  executives.
B.  Accidental  Operational  Constraints
In  many cases  operating  regulations  or  national  economic  policy  measures
applied  equally  to  foreign  and  domestic  banks  have  a  differential  negative  impact
on the  ability  of foreign  banks  to  compete  in  the  host-country  banking  market.
Limits to the volume  of assets.  liabilities  or size of loans to
individual  borrowers are  among the most prevalent of  the measures that
effectively  discriminate  against  FBAs.  The constraints  emerge  from  maximum
permissible  asset-capital  ratios  and  limits  on the  size  of loans  to individual
borrowers. They  are imposed  by most  countries  for  prudential  reasons  with  the
objective of  ensuring minimum  levels of  capitalization and  portfolio
diversification  and  so enhancing  the safety  of depository  institutions.  Also
for  prudential  reasons  many  nations  treat  FBAs  in  the  host-country  as  independent
entities.  Consequently,  asset/capital  ratios  and lending  limits  are based
exclusively  on  the  FBA's  capital  which  is  typically  just  a  small  fraction  of  the27
total  capital  of the  parent  organization.  As a result  FBAs'  total  volume  of
operations  and individual  loan sizes  are  seriously  constrained. Competitive
inequities  are  exacerbated  if this  type  of  measures  are  imposed  simultaneously
with the  enforcement  of limits  on imports  of capital.
Credit  ceilings  imposed  for  purposes  of domestic  monetary  Rolicy  may
apply  to  both foreign  and  domestic  banks,  but if foreign  banks  are  relatively
late  entrants  in  the  market,  they  have  had  less  time  to  build  up their  domestic
business  and  are consequently  more  constrained  in expanding  their  portfolios.
In some  cases,  lending  limits  are  based  on domestic  deposit  liabilities.  When
this  type  of constraints  is  enforced  simultaneouosly  with regulations  affecting
FBAs'  access  to local  deposits,  the  resulting  competitive  inequities  are  even
more  significant.
Other restrictions  resulting  from  _eneral  economic  and balance  o
Rayments Rolicies may  lead to  competitive  inequities.  Because of  the
international  orientation  of FBAs'  operations,  limitations  on foreign  exchange
transactions  affect them more negatively  than they affect their domestic
counterparts.  Constraints  on business  with nonresidents,  which typically
represents  a larger  share  of  the  FBAs'  operations  than  of  local  banks,  also  has
a  differential  effect. Capital  controls  tend  to  be  more  restrictive  for  foreign
banks that are  funding their operations  by borrowing from their parent
institution.
Other  accidental  oRerationlal  constraints  stem  from  measures  completely
divorced  from  the  banking  sector  such  as requirements  for  alien  work  permits,
or  nationality  requirements.  FBAs  may  be affected  more  severely  than  domestic
banks because they may desire staff of their own nationality  and because28
difficulties  in  obtaining  work  permits  may  limit  their  ability  to develop  their
staff.
C.  Preferential  Treatment  Measures
Some  governments  have  deliberately  reduced  competitive  inequities  affecting
FBAs  by applying  regulatory  requirements  flexibly  or  by granting  them  privileges
not extended  to  domestic  banks. In some  other  cases,  measures  applied  equally
to both groups  of competitors  have a favorable  impact  on FBAs  because  of the
nature  of their  operations.
Regulations  concerning  r  &erve  requirements  on deposits  or funding  in
the  interbank  market,  such  as  lower  reserve  requirements  on  foreign  currency  or
nonresident  deposits  than  on  domestic  deposits,  decrease  FBAs'  cost  of deposit
funds, since they hold normally  a greater proportion  of foreign  currency
liabilities  than domestic  banks.  Anther example is the waiver  of reserve
requirements  on funds raised  in the interbank  market,  which FBAs use more
extensively  than  do domestic  banks.
Preferential  measures  related  to  directed  lending include  flexibility
in the application  of credit  controls  and exemptions  from the obligation  to
support  government  bond issues,  to  participate  in  rescue  operations  of failing
firms,  or to extend loans  to the priority  sectors  identified  in government
development  plans.
Sundry  preferential  measures  include  a  variety  of regulatory  features
that  explicitly  or  accidentally  favor  FBAs. Examples  are  access  to  special  swap
facilities  not available  to domestic  banks (to  compensate  for the impact  on
foreign  bank operations  of the denial to access the discount  window, for
example),  flexibility  in the  application  of foreign  exchange  controls,  and  the29
like. In some  cases  governments  have  offered  inducements  for  the  establishment
of foreign  banking affiliates  in the form of special tax concessions,  or
preferential  tax  treatment.30
Appendix  B.  EC Bank  Legislation
The EC's Second  Banking  Directive  is viewed  as the centerpiece  of EC
banking  legislation  for the  post-1992  era.  A comprehensive  proposal  for the
Directive,  dealing  with the  powers  and  geographic  expansion  of  banks  within  the
Community,  is  discussed  by Key  (1989).  Among  the  most  important  aspects  of  this
complex  proposal  are  the  following:
- Branches  of EC banks established  throughout  the  Community  under this
directive  would  be authorized  and  supervised  by the  home  country  (single
license  and  home-country  control).
- The  directive,  however,  specifies  certain  conditions  that  an  EC  bank  must
fulfill  in order to establish  branches  without  host-country  licensing
(minimum  initial  capital requirements  and provisions  reliting  to the
identity,  extent  of  holdings,  and  suitability  of  major  shareholders).
- The directive  introduces  a list  of 'universal'  banking  powers  for  EC
banks,  which  includes  tiderwriting  and  trading,  for  customers  or for  own
account,  of practically  any  type  of security,  the  participation  in  share
issues,  money brokering,  leasing, issuing of credit cards, but not
insurance  activities.  Branches  of  banks  chartered  by individual  EC  member
states  would be permitted  to engage  in any of the listed  activities
provided  that  the  EC  home country  permits  such  activities.
- The  directive  acknowledges  the  public  interest  exception  to  the  principle
of  home-country  control  and  establishes  in  addition  three  specific  exceptions:
(i)  the  host-country  retains  exclusive  responsibility  for  measures  resulting  from
the  implementation  of  monetary  policy,  (ii)  until  further  coordination  the  host
country  retains  primary  responsibility  for the supervision  of liquidity,  and
(iii)  until  further  coordination  the  host  country  is  permitted  to  require  credit31
institutions  authorized  in another  member  state  to make sufficient  provision
against market risk with respect to operations  in host-country  securities
markets.
The approach  to the  question  of access  for  non-EC  institutions  tends  to
follow the principle of reciprocity;  details on the type of reciprocity
(reciprocal  national  treatment,  mirror-image  reciprocity 19), and  other  concepts
(such  as the  better-than-national  treatment  approach  under  which  the  Community
would  seek  to  have  a  non-EC  country  offer  EC  banks  treatment  comparable  to  that
accorded  banks  within  the  Community)  are  under  discussion.
19  Reciprocal  national  treatment  means that the Community  would offer
national  treatment  to  a  non-EC  bank  provided  that  its  non-EC  home  country  offered
national  treatment  to banks  from all EC countries. Mirror-image  reciprocity
involves  an attempt  to achieve  a precise  balancing  of the treatment  that is
accorded  EC and  non-EC  banks  in  each  other's  markets.32
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